Investigating The Impact Of Historical Costing On Real Earnings Management:  An Empirical Study by Abdel-Azim, Mohamed H. & Ibrahim, Awad E. A.
International Business & Economics Research Journal – March/April 2014 Volume 13, Number 2 
Copyright by author(s); CC-BY 387 The Clute Institute 
Investigating The Impact Of Historical 
Costing On Real Earnings Management:  
An Empirical Study 
Mohamed H. Abdel-Azim, Cairo University, Egypt 
Awad E. A. Ibrahim, Cairo University, Egypt 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
The current study examines the relationship between Historical Cost Accounting (HCA) and real 
earnings management. Accounting literature argues that HCA provides a chance for 
manipulation. HCA creates large unrealized capital gains/losses that are recognized in income 
statements only when managers decide to sell such assets. This may induce managers to 
manipulate earnings. Moreover, managers are able to decide which assets to sell and during 
which period. Therefore, managers can exploit HCA in real earnings management by interfering 
in the structuring of asset sale transactions. 
 
The current study aims to contribute to the ongoing debate over dropping HCA and replacing it 
with Fair Value Accounting (FVA). Using a sample of the 71 most actively traded non-financial 
firms listed on the Egyptian Stock Exchange during 2004–2010, multiple regression analysis is 
employed to test two main hypotheses: the income-smoothing hypothesis and the debt/equity 
hypothesis. 
 
The results provide evidence that managers in the Egyptian business environment exploit HCA in 
real earnings management to some extent. Managers with negative earnings changes tend to use 
HCA to smooth earnings, while managers with earnings changes do not. Moreover, there is no 
evidence for managers’ use of HCA to avoid violating debt contract terms based on accounting 
numbers. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
ccounting aims to provide relevant, accurate, and reliable information on a timely basis to present 
and potential users of financial reports. To achieve this aim, the Generally Accepted Accounting 
Principles (GAAP) should be flexible enough to enable managers to convey the real performance of 
firms. The accounting literature provides strong evidence that managers use GAAP flexibility to alter accounting 
numbers. The literature also shows that altering accounting reports has several negative consequences on the 
usefulness of accounting information, firms’ value, and economic resource allocation. Moreover, accounting has 
been suggested as being one of the main reasons for the worldwide financial crises of the last decade. Consequently, 
continuous attempts are being made to reduce such harmful practices by reducing the flexibility of accounting 
standards. 
 
However, it has been found that managers engage in real earnings management when less flexible 
accounting standards are applied. Managers think that real earnings management (REM) is harder to detect and is 
not considered a violation of GAAP. Ewert and Wagenhofer (2005) show that although tightening accounting 
standards reduced accounting earnings management, it increased real earnings management. Moreover, Beest (2009) 
concludes that reducing the discretion and flexibility levels of accounting standards does not eliminate earnings 
management, but is likely to affect the nature of earnings management. 
A 
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In recent years, there has been an increased trend of investigating real earnings management (REM), which 
has been concurrent with the application of more strict regulations and less flexible accounting standards. REM 
occurs when managers perform activities that deviate from the first best available practice or from normal business 
practices in order to meet certain objectives (Roychowdhury, 2006; Gunny, 2010). Examples of real earnings 
management include discretionary expenditure management, delaying the start of a positive NPV project, sales 
manipulation by reducing prices or providing more easy credit terms, early retirement of debt, overproduction to 
reduce the cost of goods sold, altering shipping schedules, and the selective sale of assets. The current study 
examines the relationship between accounting’s historical cost principle and the selective sale of assets. 
 
The measurement system most commonly adopted by enterprises to prepare their financial statements is 
historical cost accounting (HCA) (Elena, 2005). HCA requires that assets be reported at cost, and it assumes that the 
measuring unit value is stable over time. However, the measuring unit value is changeable, and HCA creates large 
unrealized gains or losses that may induce managers to exploit HCA via earnings management. In addition, 
managers are able to decide which asset to sell and during which period. 
 
Accounting literature argues that HCA can be exploited to achieve earnings management objectives. 
Herrmann et al. (2003) argue that following HCA provides a better avenue for earnings management than the 
recognition of holding income each period under current value accounting. Barlev and Haddad (2003) find that 
financial reports based on HCA obscure real financial positions and provide ample room for manipulation. Ramesh 
et al. (2004) argue that HCA creates opportunities for earnings management. Laux and Leuz (2009) argue that since 
historical cost accounting does not recognize gains unless assets are sold, it may provide incentives for managers to 
sell assets whose value has appreciated. 
 
Asset sale strategy is examined as a real activity that managers may use to manage earnings since assets 
recorded at historical cost hold large unrealized gains/losses that may induce managers to manipulate earnings using 
asset sales. Moreover, the sale of assets is prevalent in Egyptian business, where about 75% of firm-year 
observations reported non-zero income from asset sales. In addition, income from asset sales is significant enough to 
matter, as it represents about 29% of net income and 7% of net sales for the firms studied. Furthermore, income 
from asset sales contains a discretionary component where managers can determine the timing of asset sales and 
select assets with large unrealized capital gains in order to benefit opportunistically from the gap between historical 
cost and market value (Brown, 1999). 
 
This paper contributes to accounting literature in two ways. First, it is the first study that investigates the 
relationship between historical cost accounting and real earnings management in Egypt. Second, the research 
problem is concurrent with managers’ use of real earnings management, especially following the implementation of 
stricter financial regulations and less flexible accounting standards. 
 
Sections of this paper provide background for earnings management, discussing how managers exploit 
HCA in earnings management, as well as the related literature; discuss hypothesis development, variable 
specification and measurement, as well as the study model; include the study sample, study period, and data 
collection methods; demonstrate the methods used in the data analysis and the results of using such methods; and 
comprise study conclusions. 
 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
Several studies discovered and examined the relationship between historical cost accounting and real 
earnings management. Bartov (1993) is a pioneer in this field and is considered to provide the first significant study 
that addresses this relationship. It finds that managers exploit HCA by interfering in the structuring of asset sale 
transactions to manage earnings. A negative significant correlation is found between income from asset sales and 
earnings change, which is consistent with the income-smoothing hypothesis. A positive significant correlation is 
found between income from asset sales and the debt/equity ratio, which is in line with the debt/equity hypothesis. In 
addition, it is found that asset sales in the fourth quarter are greater than those in other quarters, which is consistent 
with the timing of asset sales. 
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Following Bartov, Herrmann et al. (2003) proposed and examined the question of whether Japanese 
managers exploit HCA in earnings management using asset sales. The study results are consistent with earnings 
management expectations. The study shows that Japanese managers manipulate earnings through the sale of fixed 
assets and marketable securities to meet current and future performance expectations. 
 
In addition, Poitras et al. (2002) examined the relationship between HCA and real earnings management in 
Singapore. The study finds that managers use income from the sale of assets only to manage earnings upward. Firms 
with a negative earnings change were found to realize more capital gains from the sale of assets, while firms with a 
positive earnings change were found not to use asset sales to reduce net income. In addition, results proved that 
managers do not use income from the sale of assets to manage the debt/equity ratio. However, these results are 
inconsistent with those of Bartov. Poitras et al. (2002) explained these inconsistent results by the differences in 
firms’ characteristics and in accounting regulations between the USA and Singapore. 
 
Hillier et al. (2005) investigated the reasons other than the sale of assets, effects of asset sales on 
subsequent operating performance, and market reactions to an announcement of a sale of assets. The study results 
assert that poor performance, high leverage, and liquidity problems are the main reasons for sales of assets. Further, 
a significant improvement is observed in firms’ performance and is indicated by a positive one-day reaction in the 
share price. In addition, it is found that managers use the proceeds from the sale of assets for debt repayment. These 
results reveal that asset sale transactions are completed to achieve objectives consistent with those of earnings 
management. 
 
Finally, Wang et al. (2010) explored the relationship between HCA and earnings management in Taiwan. 
The study finds that when sample firms are about to report losses, managers manipulate earnings through the sale of 
historical cost assets that hold capital gains in order to avoid reporting losses. Moreover, the authors find that 55-
57% of sample firms with small pre-managed losses manipulate reported earnings to avoid reporting losses. 
 
HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT 
 
A number of studies have investigated the relationship between historical cost accounting and earnings 
management (e.g., Bartov, 1993; Black et al., 1998; Poitras et al., 2002; Harahap, 2009) and have proposed two 
common hypotheses - the income-smoothing hypothesis and the debt/equity hypothesis. The main hypothesis of the 
current study is that Egyptian business managers exploit the shortcomings of HCA and practice real earnings 
management by interfering in asset sale transactions. Following the previous related studies, both the income-
smoothing and debt/equity hypotheses will be examined. 
 
Income-Smoothing Hypothesis 
 
Bartov (1993) states that the earnings-smoothing hypothesis suggests that earnings are manipulated to 
reduce fluctuations around the level that is considered normal for the firm. Black et al. (1998) state that income 
smoothing is a specific form of earnings management that managers follow to reduce earnings volatility and keep 
earnings close to a certain level. Poitras et al. (2002) argue that the income-smoothing hypothesis proposes that 
managers manipulate earnings to achieve a smaller variable and a smoother earnings level in order to achieve certain 
earnings management objectives. 
 
The accounting literature documents several incentives that motivate managers to smooth earnings. For 
example, income smoothing can be used to convey the level of future income that investors can expect (Hand, 
1989). Further, income smoothing can remove information asymmetries between management and investors, which 
may reduce the cost of capital (Botosan, 1997). Graham et al. (2005) find that more than 78% of surveyed 
executives would trade economic value for income-smoothing. They also find that 88.70% of surveyed executives 
believe that income smoothing is perceived as less risky by investors; 79.70% believe that income smoothing makes 
it easier for analysts and investors to predict future earnings; 66.20% think that income smoothing assures investors, 
lenders, customers, and suppliers that business is stable; and 46.30% believe that income smoothing conveys higher 
future growth prospects. 
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Several earnings management methods enable managers to smooth income. The current study examines 
two methods that help managers smooth earnings: 1) to select assets to sell with unrealized capital gains, to delay an 
asset sale transaction that will report losses, or to accelerate an asset sale transaction that will report gains in order to 
manage earnings upward and 2) to select assets to sell with unrealized capital losses, to delay an asset sale 
transaction that will report capital gains, or to accelerate an asset sale transaction that will report capital losses in 
order to manage earnings downward. 
 
It is expected that Egyptian business managers exploit historical cost accounting and interfere in the 
structuring of asset sale transactions in order to smooth income. Therefore, the current study proposes the income-
smoothing hypothesis in a form similar to that of Bartov (1993) and Black et al. (1998), as follows: 
 
H1: There is a negative relationship between income from asset sales and the earnings change (exclusive of 
asset sale effects). 
 
Debt/Equity Hypothesis 
 
Contracts are used widely between firms and other related parties, such as management, stakeholders, 
lenders, and suppliers, to specify the terms that both parties are obligated to follow. Some of these terms depend on 
accounting numbers in order to help monitor and regulate the contractual relations between the related parties 
(Healy & Wahlen, 1999). In the case that the firm violates some of these terms, some restrictions and sanctions are 
imposed, which may represent a strong incentive for management to meet these terms, even via earnings 
management. 
 
For example, debt covenants require borrowing firms to maintain specific levels of accounting ratios, such 
as minimum working capital, interest coverage (net income to interest expense), and the debt-equity ratio. A 
violation of these ratios represents a violation of the debt contract terms, which imposes costs on the firm. These 
costs may involve either renegotiating the debt or restricting the investing and financing activities of the borrowing 
firm, such as restricting dividend payments or issuance of a new debt (Bartov, 1993). To avoid such costs, 
management may consider a wide range of earnings management techniques to make accounting data meet the 
contract terms. 
 
In order to explore whether debt covenants represent incentives for earnings management, related research 
has adopted and tested the debt-equity hypothesis (e.g., Collins et al., 1980; Holthausen, 1980; Bartov, 1993; Black 
et al., 1998; Harahap, 2009). The debt-equity hypothesis suggests a positive relationship between the debt-equity 
ratio and managers’ choice of earnings-increasing activities (Watts & Zimmerman, 1986; Bartov, 1993; Black et al., 
1998). These earnings-increasing activities increase the denominator of the debt-equity ratio by increasing net 
income, which improves the debt-equity ratio to meet the required levels. It is noteworthy that the sale of assets may 
be an earnings-increasing activity when managers decide to sell assets that are recorded at a historical cost and hold 
large unrealized gains. The current study adopts the debt-equity hypothesis in a form similar to that of Bartov (1993) 
and Black et al. (1998) as follows: 
 
H2: There is a positive relationship between income from asset sales and the debt/equity ratio. 
 
VARIABLE SPECIFICATIONS AND STUDY MODEL 
 
Dependent Variables 
 
The proxy for earnings management should be significant enough to matter, but it must also be 
discretionary (Schipper, 1989). In the current study, income from asset sales (IAS) is used as a proxy for real 
earnings management through the sale of assets. IAS is commonly reported in Egypt, where more than 75% of the 
firm-year observations in the study sample report non-zero income from asset sales. IAS also constitutes a 
significant portion of the reported net income and net sales. In addition, IAS contains a discretionary component 
where managers can determine the timing of asset sales and can select assets with large unrealized capital gains to 
benefit opportunistically from the gap between the historical cost and the market value (Brown, 1999). 
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Independent Variables 
 
The first independent variable, earnings change (ΔEARNit), is used as a proxy for earnings management by 
smoothing income since it is expected that managers manipulate earnings to achieve a smaller variable and a 
smoother earnings level. ΔEARN is measured as the difference between the net income of the event year (exclusive 
of income from asset sales) and the net income of the previous year (EARNt – EARNt-1), deflated by beginning-of-
the-year total assets. The debt/equity ratio (DRit-1) is the second independent variable and is used as a proxy to 
determine whether managers practice earnings management to avoid violating the accounting terms of debt 
contracts. (DRit-1) is measured as the ratio of the book value of both long-term debt and the current portion of long-
term debt to the book value of owners’ equity at the beginning of the event year. 
 
Control Variables 
 
Four control variables are employed to control liquidity effects, growth effects, size effects, and the asset 
sale level. The current ratio is used as a proxy for liquidity effects with a negative correlation expectation. Further, 
change of sales, which is the difference between current sales and prior sales divided by prior sales, is used as a 
proxy for growth effects with an expectation of a negative correlation. Moreover, the log of total assets of the event 
year is used as a proxy of firms’ size to control for size effects with an expectation of a positive correlation, while 
Lag (IAS) is used to control for the effects of the asset sale level with an expectation of a positive correlation. 
 
Study Model 
 
The multiple regression model is used to examine the relationship between income from asset sales and two 
independent variables, earnings change and the debt/equity ratio. In addition, the model contains four control 
variables to avoid the correlated omitted variables problem. 
 
IASit = β0 + β1 (ΔEARNit) + β2 (DRit-1) + β3 (CRit-1) + β4 (Δ Salesit) + β5 (LogAit) + β6 Lag (IASit) + ε 
 
IASit = Income (either gain or loss) from sale of assets scaled by prior year total assets. 
β0 = Model constant. 
β1–β6 = Beta coefficients of the model’s independent variables. 
ΔEARNit = Earnings change scaled by total assets at the beginning of the event year. 
DRit-1 = Debt/equity ratio at the beginning of the event year. 
CRit-1 = Current ratio at the beginning of the event year. 
Δ Salesit = Sales change of the event year. 
LogAit = Natural logarithm of the total assets of the event year. 
Lag (IASit) = Lag of the dependent variable scaled by prior year total assets. 
ε = The model residual, or all other variables that influence the (IAS) variable other than those included in 
  the model. 
 
STUDY SAMPLE AND DATA COLLECTION 
 
The study population includes all of the companies listed on the Egyptian Stock Exchange at the end of 
2010. According to Egyptian Stock Exchange’s website, there were 212 firms listed in 2010. Financial firms are 
excluded from the sample because they have a different nature. The study sample included the most actively traded, 
non-financial firms listed in all disclosure books issued by the Egyptian Stock Exchange during the financial years 
2004-2010. The final sample consists of 71 firms with 469 firm-year observations. 
 
The sample is divided into two sub-samples based on the earnings change variable: a negative sub-sample 
that contains observations with a negative earnings change and a positive sub-sample that comprises observations 
with a positive earnings change. Table 1 presents the firm-year observations of the three samples across study years. 
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Table 1:  Firm-Year Observations of the Study Sample and Sub-Samples 
 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 Total 
No. of study firm observations 71 71 71 71 71 71 71 497 
Less: missing observations 9 7 8 4 0 0 0 28 
Net firm-year observations 62 64 63 67 71 71 71 469 
Negative sub-sample observations 22 14 22 13 26 38 35 170 
Positive sub-sample observations 40 50 41 54 45 33 36 299 
Firm-year observations with capital gains 27 31 38 44 44 52 56 292 
Firm-year observations with capital losses 11 15 11 7 8 5 5 62 
Non-zero income from asset sales observations 38 46 49 51 52 57 61 354 
% of observations reporting capital gains 44% 48% 60% 66% 72% 73% 79% 62% 
 
Table 1 shows that firm-year observations that report non-zero income from asset sales comprise about 
75% of total observations, while firm-year observations with capital gains comprise about 82% of observations with 
non-zero income from asset sales, which indicates that the selling of historical cost assets is a prevalent behavior and 
that reporting capital gains is more common than reporting capital losses. 
 
DATA ANALYSIS 
 
Two statistical techniques are used in the study - the Pearson correlation test and multiple regression 
analysis. Descriptive statistics are shown below for the study variables, followed by the Pearson correlation test and 
the multiple regression analysis, which are conducted after deleting the data outliers. 
 
Descriptive Statistics 
 
Table 2 presents the mean, the median, and the range of the total sample for all variables across all study 
years. 
 
Table 2:  Descriptive Statistics of the Total Sample Variables 
IAS = Income from asset sales (either gains of losses) for the event year scaled by At-1. (ΔEARN) = (Event year net income exclusive of capital 
gains or losses – prior year net income) scaled by At-1. (DRit-1) = Sum of the book value of long-term debts and the current portion of long-term 
debts divided by the book value of owners’ equity for the beginning of the event year. (CRit-1) = Book value of current assets divided by the 
book value of current liabilities at the beginning of the event year. (Δ Salesit) = (Event year net sales – prior year net sales) divided by prior year 
net sales. (LogAit) = Natural log of total assets of the event year. Lag (IASit) = Income from asset sales (either gains or losses) of the prior period 
scaled by At–1 (i.e., lag of IAS). 
 
The data presented in Table 2 provide several notable findings: 
 
1. Most firm-year observations realized more capital gains than capital losses from asset sales transactions 
since all means and medians of all years are positive. 
2. The debt/equity ratio does not represent an incentive for managers to manage earnings through the sale of 
assets since the means of income from asset sales are higher in years beginning with lower debt/equity 
ratios. 
3. The current ratio may represent an incentive for earnings management through the sale of assets since the 
means of income from asset sales are higher in years beginning with lower current ratios. 
Year
RangeMedianMeanRangeMedianMeanRangeMedianMeanRangeMedianMeanRangeMedianMeanRangeMedianMeanrangeMedianMeanRangeMedianMeanVariable/Statistic
2.190.010.830.120.030.590.110.010.350.140.010.562.180.013.610.090.000.210.260.000.430.010.000.031- IASit
8.650.730.020.360.020.180.73-0.77-1.737.950.71-10.790.502.113.930.760.752.381.062.185.580.280.821.852- ΔEARNit
9.150.070.454.840.050.276.680.060.387.220.070.427.310.070.347.730.100.487.270.140.577.610.210.763- DRit-1
67.431.440.1716.171.722.516.681.612.227.501.582.127.531.471.8511.871.401.7732.591.211.9467.431.272.49 4- CRit-1
35.780.110.4416.500.100.3635.78-0.030.6627.200.180.574.300.090.183.120.110.3118.260.150.693.920.250.305- Δ Salesit
8.5313.7313.867.0114.1114.187.3314.0414.097.0413.9714.058.5013.8713.867.8713.7313.607.6513.4913.617.1513.5013.556- LogAit
0.670.000.400.100.010.320.150.010.400.660.011.300.080.000.170.260.000.480.010.000.020.010.000.007- Lag(IASit)
All years (n=469)2004 (n=62) 2010 = (n=71)2007 (n=67)2006 (n=63)2005 (n=64) 2009 (n=71)2008 (n=71)
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4. The growth rate may represent an incentive for earnings management through the sale of assets since the 
highest mean of income from asset sales is matched with the lowest growth rate. 
5. There is a positive correlation between firm size and income from asset sales since the lowest mean of the 
(IAS) variable is matched with the lowest mean of the (LogA) variable. 
 
Table 3 provides the descriptive statistics of both the negative and positive sub-samples.  
 
Table 3: Descriptive Statistics of the Sub-Samples’ Variables 
 
The descriptive statistics in Table 3 provide the following notable findings: 
 
1. More than half of firm-year observations exhibit a positive earnings change (63.75%). 
2. Firms experiencing a negative earnings change have realized more capital gains than firms exhibiting a 
positive earnings change since the means and medians of the (IAS) variable of the negative sub-sample are 
higher for most study years (6/7) than those of the positive sub-sample. 
3. Firms in the positive sub-sample have higher debt/equity ratios than firms in the negative sub-sample since 
most means and medians of the (DR) variable of the positive sub-sample are higher than those of the 
negative sub-sample for most study years and for all years combined. 
4. Firms in the positive sub-sample have lower liquidity ratios than firms in the negative sub-sample since the 
means of the (CR) variable of the negative sub-sample are higher than those of the positive sub-sample for 
all years combined and for four individual years. 
5. Firms in the negative sub-sample have lower growth rates than firms in the positive sub-sample since all 
means and medians of the sales growth variable for the negative sub-sample are lower than those for the 
positive sub-sample for most study years. 
6. Firms in the negative sub-sample are smaller in terms of total assets than those in the positive sub-sample 
since both the means and medians of the (LogA) of the negative sub-sample are lower than those of the 
positive sub-sample for all years combined and for most individual study years. 
 
Pearson Correlation Test 
 
The Pearson correlation test enables us to test the strength and direction of the relationship between the 
quantitative variables and to determine whether a multicollinearity problem exists between the independent 
variables. 
Year
RangeMedianMeanRangeMedianMeanRangeMedianMeanRangeMedianMeanRangeMedianMeanRangeMedianMeanrangeMedianMeanRangeMedianMeanVariable/Statistic
0.260.020.760.110.150.780.110.010.560.140.011.140.060.041.030.090.010.460.240.001.910.010.010.061- (IASit)
7.68-2.54-9.070.14-2.14-2.910.22-4.19-5.867.68-3.31-37.370.17-2.14-3.320.33-2.05-5.480.09-0.98-2.330.08-1.91-2.212- (ΔEARNit)
5.030.070.304.840.050.304.680.110.252.470.040.320.800.030.132.880.100.374.690.050.442.050.060.283- (DRit-1)
67.431.432.4415.031.502.416.491.552.296.941.612.253.391.371.5511.761.592.291.411.211.2767.431.264.40 4- (CRit-1)
35.780.020.281.330.070.0635.78-0.180.701.430.090.020.930.020.021.320.090.128.690.110.802.470.100.185- (Δ Salesit)
7.9913.5813.746.6913.9114.127.3313.9814.156.7613.9614.015.9313.6213.645.6813.2113.064.8213.3812.896.2213.2313.436- (LogAit)
0.660.010.770.100.010.410.140.010.750.660.013.010.060.000.490.020.010.130.010.000.060.010.000.007- Lag(IASit)
Year
RangeMedianMeanRangeMedianMeanRangeMedianMeanRangeMedianMeanRangeMedianMeanRangeMedianMeanrangeMedianMeanRangeMedianMeanVariable/Statistic
2.190.000.880.090.020.420.020.010.120.050.000.232.180.014.240.010.000.070.020.000.020.010.000.011- (IASit)
0.972.515.190.232.093.180.152.323.020.272.034.580.343.375.680.422.466.600.973.307.800.192.744.092- (ΔEARNit)
9.150.080.543.610.030.245.670.040.547.227.100.487.310.080.397.030.090.536.610.200.617.610.321.023- (DRit-1)
32.591.441.9615.631.892.616.691.712.137.461.562.047.441.521.933.841.341.5032.591.222.134.261.281.44 4- (CRit-1)
27.220.180.5416.310.150.6513.390.110.6227.180.280.894.300.100.223.120.160.4218.260.170.663.920.290.375- (Δ Salesit)
8.5213.8013.937.0114.1414.246.4214.0614.037.0213.9814.078.5013.9313.917.8713.8313.897.0013.6113.826.8213.5913.626- (LogAit)
0.280.000.180.030.010.240.020.000.000.060.010.310.040.000.090.260.000.670.010.000.010.000.000.007- Lag(IASit)
Panel A: Descriptive Statistics of Negative Sub-sample
Panel B: Descriptive Statistics of Positive Sub-sample
All years (n=299)2010 (n=36)2009 (n=33)2008 (n=45)2007 (n=54)2006 (n=41)2005 (n=50)2004 (n=40)
All years (n=170)2010 (n=35)2009 (n=38)2008 (n=26)2007 (n=13)2006 (n=22)2005 (n=14)2004 (n=22)
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Pearson Correlation Test of the Total Study Sample 
 
Table 4 presents the correlations between all study variables with a two-tailed significance test for the total 
study sample. 
 
Table 4:  Pearson Correlation Test for the Total Study Sample 
Variables IAS ΔEARN DR CR Δ Sales LogA Lag (IAS) 
IAS 1       
ΔEARN -.818** 1      
DR 0.077 -0.065 1     
CR -0.032 0.059 -0.087 1    
Δ Sales 0.038 0.048 -0.003 0.03 1   
LogA .097* -0.038 0.091 -0.08 0.02 1  
Lag (IAS) .269** -.140** 0.013 -0.014 0.008 .096* 1 
** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (two-tailed). * Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (two-tailed). 
 
Regarding the first study hypothesis, it is apparent that the earnings change variable is negatively correlated 
with the dependent variable (IAS) and it is statistically significant at 1%, which supports the income-smoothing 
hypothesis adopted by the current study. Regarding the second study hypothesis, the debt/equity ratio was found to 
have an insignificant correlation with the dependent variable (IAS), which indicates that higher levels of debt/equity 
ratios do not represent an incentive for managers to realize more capital gains in order to avoid violating restrictions 
of debts agreements. This result is consistent with the results of the descriptive statistical analysis of the total study 
sample. Consequently, the current study’s second hypothesis is rejected. 
 
Pearson Correlation Test of the Negative Sub-Sample 
 
Table 5 provides the results of the Pearson correlation test for the negative sub-sample. 
 
Table 5: Pearson Correlation Test for the Negative Sub-Sample 
Variables IAS ΔEARN DR CR Δ Sales LogA Lag (IAS) 
IAS 1       
ΔEARN -.762** 1      
DR 0.143 -.279** 1     
CR -.060 0.029 -0.1 1    
Δ Sales -0.026 0.02 -0.029 0.038 1   
LogA -0.033 -0.074 .405** -0.084 -0.047 1  
Lag (IAS) .250** -0.145 0.063 -0.021 0.032 .181* 1 
** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (two-tailed). * Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (two-tailed). 
 
Table 5 shows that the earnings change variable has a negative correlation with the (IAS) variable and is 
significant at 1%, which means that when there is a higher degree of negative earnings change, managers realize 
more capital gains in order to increase net income, while managers realize fewer capital gains when the negative 
earnings change is lower. This finding is consistent with the results of the descriptive statistical analysis. Therefore, 
the current study’s first hypothesis is accepted. On the other hand, the (DR) variable, which is presented to test the 
current study’s second hypothesis, has an insignificant correlation with (IAS), which means that a higher debt/equity 
ratio does not motivate managers in the negative sub-sample to reduce this ratio through the sale of assets. This 
result is consistent with the results of both the Pearson correlation test and the descriptive analysis of the total study 
sample; therefore, the second study hypothesis is rejected. 
 
Pearson Correlation Test of the Positive Sub-Sample 
 
Table 6 shows the results of the Pearson correlation test for the positive sub-sample. 
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Table 6: Pearson Correlation Test for the Positive Sub-Sample 
Variables IAS ΔEARN DR CR Δ Sales LogA Lag (IAS) 
IAS 1       
ΔEARN 0.059 1      
DR -0.015 0.03 1     
CR -0.019 .467** -0.104 1    
Δ Sales .122* .185** 0.003 0.029 1   
LogA 0.062 0.007 0.019 -0.064 0.075 1  
Lag (IAS) 0.022 0.012 0.003 -0.001 -0.032 -0.015 1 
** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (two-tailed). * Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (two-tailed). 
 
First, the earnings change variable, which is used to test the current study’s first hypothesis, has no 
significant correlation with the (IAS) variable, which shows that for firm-year observations with a positive earnings 
change, managers do not manipulate earnings by income-smoothing through income from asset sales. Therefore, the 
current study’s first hypothesis is rejected. Second, the (DR) variable, which is used to test the current study’s 
second hypothesis, has no significant relationship with the (IAS) variable, which means that during positive earnings 
change years, managers do not use income from asset sales to improve the debt/equity ratio in order to avoid 
violation of debt covenants. Consequently, the second hypothesis is rejected. 
 
Multiple Regression Analysis 
 
Due to the sensitivity of the regression results to outliers, and following Abdel-Fattah (2008), who suggests 
running the analysis twice (with and without outliers), regression analysis is conducted twice in the current study 
(with and without outliers), which allows us to observe the effects of these observations on the results and to avoid 
any possible ethical issues. However, the results of the regression analysis with the outliers are not included. 
Moreover, any observation with a standardized residual greater than 4.5 is considered an extreme observation and is 
deleted. 
 
Regression Analysis of the Total Sample 
 
Table 7 shows the results for the regression analysis of the total sample. It is apparent that the regression 
model is significant, as the F-value is greater than the scheduled value. Further, the model regression line can be 
considered a good fitting line since the standard error is very low. 
 
Table 7: Multiple Regression Outputs of the Total Sample 
Panel A: Model Summary 
 R R-Square Adjusted R2 
Std. Error 
of Estimate 
F Sig. 
 0.838 0.703 0.699 0.00224 167.896 .000 
Panel B: Regression Model Coefficients 
Independent 
Variables 
Unstd. Coefficients 
Std. 
Coefficients T 
Sig 
Collinearity 
Statistics 
B Std. Error Beta  Tolerance VIF 
(Constant) -0.001 0.001  -1.359 0.175   
ΔEARN -0.009 0.000 -.798 -29.789 0.000 0.971 1.030 
DR 0.000 0.000 0.021 0.775 0.439 0.982 1.018 
CR 0.000 0.000 0.021 0.784 0.433 0.984 1.016 
Δ Sales 0.000 0.000 0.074 2.793 0.005 0.996 1.004 
LogA 0.000 0.000 0.051 1.898 0.058 0.977 1.024 
Lag (IAS) 0.018 0.003 0.152 5.659 0.000 0.972 1.029 
 
Panel A shows that the regression model explains 70% of the variations in the (IAS) level, where R-square 
is .70. The earnings change variable, which is used to test the income-smoothing hypothesis, appears to have a 
negative, highly significant correlation with income from asset sales at 1%, which is consistent with the income-
smoothing hypothesis. However, the debt/equity variable, which is included to test the debt/equity hypothesis, seems  
 
International Business & Economics Research Journal – March/April 2014 Volume 13, Number 2 
Copyright by author(s); CC-BY 396 The Clute Institute 
to have a positive, insignificant relationship with income from asset sales, which is consistent with the results of 
both descriptive statistics analysis and the Pearson correlation test; therefore, the second hypothesis is rejected. 
 
On the other hand, the first control variable (CR) seems to have a positive, insignificant correlation with 
income from asset sales, which is inconsistent with the financing hypothesis and the researchers’ expectations. The 
second control variable (sales growth) is significantly correlated with income from asset sales at 1%, but not in the 
expected direction. The third control variable (size effects) is statistically significant at 10% in the expected 
direction, which reveals that large firms are more likely to engage in asset sales at capital gains than small firms 
since these firms are more likely to follow more conservative accounting methods, such as historical cost 
accounting. Finally, the coefficient of the Lag (IAS) control variable seems to be significant at 1% and is correlated 
with (IAS) in the expected direction. 
 
Regression Analysis of the Negative Sub-Sample 
 
Table 8 includes the results of the regression analysis of the negative sub-sample. Panel A shows that the 
full regression model can explain 62% of the variations in the (IAS) level and that the F-value is significant. The 
standard error of estimate is .005, which indicates that the regression line is a better fitting line. Moreover, Panel B 
shows that the earnings change has a negative, significant correlation with the dependent variable (IAS), which 
agrees with the results of the Pearson correlation test; therefore, the income-smoothing hypothesis is accepted. 
Further, the debt/equity variable is insignificantly correlated with the (IAS) variable, which indicates that higher 
debt/equity ratios do not put pressure on managers to manage earnings through the sale of assets, which is consistent 
with the results of the Pearson correlation test; therefore, the debt/equity hypothesis is rejected. 
 
Regarding the control variables, both the current ratio and sales growth variables are insignificantly 
correlated with the (IAS) variable, which is consistent with the Pearson correlation test. This means that managers in 
the negative sub-sample do not consider liquidity levels or sales growth levels when making an asset sale decision. 
Further, it is apparent that there is a negative, significant correlation between firm size and income from asset sales, 
which is in contrast with the researchers’ expectations. Finally, Panel B shows that there is a positive, significant 
correlation between the Lag (IAS) variable, which is used as a proxy for the asset sales level, and the (IAS) variable 
at 5% in the expected direction. 
 
Table 8:  Multiple Regression Outputs of the Negative Sub-Sample 
Panel A: Model Summary 
 R R-Square Adjusted R2 
Std. Error 
of Estimate 
F Sig. 
 0.785 0.617 0.601 0.005 39.141 0.000 
Panel B: Regression Model Coefficients 
Independent 
Variables 
Unstd. Coefficients 
Std. 
Coefficients T 
Sig 
Collinearity 
Statistics 
B Std. Error Beta  Tolerance VIF 
(Constant) 0.008 0.003  2.280 0.024   
ΔEARN -0.009 0.001 -0.755 -13.991 0.000 0.901 1.110 
DR 0.000 0.001 -0.040 -0.676 0.500 0.768 1.302 
CR 0.000 0.000 -0.047 -0.906 0.366 0.986 1.014 
Δ Sales 0.000 0.000 -0.021 -0.402 0.688 0.994 1.006 
LogA 0.000 0.000 -0.107 -1.869 0.064 0.805 1.243 
Lag (IAS) 0.022 0.007 0.161 3.061 0.003 0.945 1.058 
 
Regression Analysis of the Positive Sub-Sample 
 
Table 9 shows the full regression model is insignificant and could not be used as a predictive or an 
explanatory tool for variations of income from asset sales variable since R-square is very low and F-value is not 
significant. 
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Table 9: Multiple Regression Outputs of the Positive Sub-Sample 
Panel A: Model Summary 
 R R-Square Adjusted R2 
Std. Error 
of Estimate 
F Sig. 
 0.148 0.0.22 0.001 0.003 1.072 0.380 
Panel B: Regression Model Coefficients 
Independent 
Variables 
Unstd. Coefficients 
Std. 
Coefficients T 
Sig 
Collinearity 
Statistics 
B Std. Error Beta  Tolerance VIF 
(Constant) 0.000 0.001  -0.484 0.629   
ΔEARN 0.002 0.002 0.063 0.924 0.356 0.746 1.341 
DR 0.000 0.000 -0.023 -0.398 0.691 0.981 1.019 
CR 0.000 0.000 -0.050 -0.748 0.455 0.761 1.314 
Δ Sales 0.000 0.000 0.109 1.818 0.070 0.955 1.047 
LogA 0.000 0.000 0.051 0.873 0.384 0.989 1.011 
Lag (IAS) 0.004 0.010 0.025 0.429 0.669 0.998 1.002 
 
Unlike the results of both the total sample and the negative sub-sample, which improved significantly after 
removing the outliers, the regression results of the positive sub-sample became worse after deleting the outliers. It is 
apparent from Panel B that none of the model-independent variables are statistically significant, except for the sales 
growth variable which has a P-value smaller than 10%; all the other variables report P-values greater than 10%. The 
regression analysis of the positive sub-sample provides strong evidence that when firm-year observations report a 
positive earnings change, managers do not have any incentive to manage earnings, either to smooth earnings or to 
improve debt/equity ratios to meet contractual debt agreements. Consequently, both the income-smoothing and 
debt/equity hypotheses are rejected. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
Accounting literature has extensively investigated the financial crises of the last decade. A number of 
studies have cited accounting numbers manipulation as one of the main reasons for the collapse of long-standing 
firms. In addition, there is strong pressure on accounting standard setters to consider the harmful effects of earnings 
management. Therefore, accounting standard setters have attempted to reduce the flexibility of accounting 
standards. However, the accounting literature has shown that managers have engaged in real earnings management, 
especially after the implementation of stricter financial regulations and less flexible accounting standards. Therefore, 
the current study has examined the potential impact of historical cost accounting on real earnings management in the 
emerging market of Egypt. 
 
The results indicate that the income-smoothing hypothesis, the first hypothesis proposed by the current 
study, is supported by the results of the descriptive statistical analysis, the Pearson correlation test, and the multiple 
regression analysis for the total sample, while it is supported only by the Pearson correlation test and the regression 
analysis for the negative sub-sample. However, it is rejected for the positive sub-sample by all three tests. This 
means that when managers face a higher negative earnings change, they resort to the sale of assets at historical cost 
in order to increase their net income by the large unrealized capital gains. However, when managers face a higher 
positive earnings change, they lower their sale of assets. The results for the positive sub-sample reveal that, in 
general, earnings are smoothed when the earnings change is negative. 
 
The debt/equity hypothesis, the second hypothesis proposed by the current study, is rejected by the results 
of the descriptive statistical analysis, the Pearson correlation test, and the multiple regression analysis for all three 
study samples. This indicates that when managers face a higher debt/equity ratio, they do not decide to realize 
higher capital gains from the sale of historical cost assets in order to reduce the debt/equity ratio. Therefore, the 
debt/equity hypothesis is rejected. 
 
Moreover, the results indicate that lower liquidity levels, measured by the current ratio, do not motivate 
managers to increase liquidity ratios through the sale of assets for all three study samples, which is inconsistent with 
the financing hypothesis. Further, the results emphasize that lower growth rates do not represent incentives for 
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managers to manage earnings through realizing capital gains. In addition, the findings support the researchers’ 
expectation that larger firms follow more conservative valuation methods, such as historical cost accounting, which 
agrees with the expectations and results of Herrmann et al. (2003). 
 
Finally, the regression analysis of the three study samples provides strong evidence for the sensitivity of the 
regression results to outliers. For both the total sample and the negative sub-sample, the regression indicators 
improved significantly after the outliers were removed; however, those of the positive sub-sample worsened. This 
conclusion is in line with that of Herrmann et al. (2003) and Abdel-Fattah (2008) who argue that extreme 
observations harm and distort the regression results. 
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